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This paper uses new estimates of the dates on which different countries have experienced their 
demographic transition to address two empirical questions. First, I study the importance of 
different socioeconomic variables on the timing of these transitions. Second, I distinguish between 
countries that have experienced early and late demographic transitions and compare their relative 
income around the transition date. My results indicate that the size of a country’s urban population 
plays a crucial role in triggering its demographic transition. In particular, after controlling for 
income and total population, more urbanized countries tend to experience an earlier demographic 
transition. Moreover, countries that experience an early demographic transition (before 1950) are 
much richer than latecomers, suggesting that urbanization plays a more important role than income 
in the latter. One interpretation of these results is that a country’s level of income and rate of 
urbanization are substitutable factors that trigger the country’s demographic transition. Finally, if 
one accepts the premise that urban agglomerations enhance both technological progress and the 
demand for human capital, the results provide indirect support for theories that highlight these 
factors as triggers of the demographic transition or the escape from Malthusian traps.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The demographic transition, often known as the sustained decline in a given country’s 
population growth rate,1 has been extensively studied by demographers and, more 
recently, by economists. Most existing studies, as summarized below, focus on the 
experiences of a few European countries during the nineteenth century. The case of 
developing countries has been much more difficult to analyze because the 
demographic transition has just begun in many of them and reliable data are scarce. 
                                                 
*I thank Nicholas Crafts and Andrew Mountford for valuable comments on an earlier draft of the paper. I 
acknowledge financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (proyecto SEJ2007-62656). 
 
1A more accurate definition of the demographic transition distinguishes between three different phases: the 
first one is characterized by high birth and death rates, and so roughly zero population growth. In the 
second phase, population grows as mortality falls sharply while fertility remains high. Finally, in the third 
phase both death and birth rates fall and so population remains roughly constant again. See Ray (1998) for 
a detailed description of this process. Sometimes, as is the case in this paper, the so-called demographic 
transition refers to only the last phase.      
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Moreover, the few existing cross-country studies do not offer a formal comparison 
between so-called “early” demographic transitions (nineteenth or early-twentieth 
century) and “late” ones (late-twentieth century). 
 
This paper uses a new dataset on estimates of the demographic transition dates for 
a large set of countries to analyze two aspects of this unique and crucial structural 
change. I first examine the main determinants of late demographic transitions by 
analyzing data for mostly developing countries in the 1950-2000 period.2 Next, using 
historical data on per-capita income, I compare the relative level of development at 
the time of transition in early and late episodes. I then argue that these two empirical 
results may be interpreted as supporting some existing theories of the demographic 
transition or the escape from the Malthusian trap.  
 
The main result of the paper is that a country’s level of urban population is a very 
powerful explanatory variable of the cross-country differences in the year at which 
the demographic transition takes place. Even after controlling for a country’s per-
capita gross domestic product (GDP), more urbanized countries tend to experience 
the demographic transition earlier than less urbanized ones.  
 
This finding provides indirect support for theories arguing that demographic 
transitions are mainly driven by a rise in the demand for human capital (Galor and 
Weil 2000). A common element of these models is that at some point in a country’s 
development process, population pressure induces technological progress, which, in 
turn, enhances the demand for human capital.3 This translates into an increase in the 
return to human capital, which then induces a switch from quantity to quality of 
children. When a significant fraction of households decides to have fewer and more 
educated children, a demographic transition takes place. While these theories of 
demographic transition have a strong theoretical foundation, testing them empirically 
has proven difficult, mainly because there is a lack of accurate data on either 
technological progress or wages for a large enough span of countries and years. The 
finding that it is urban--not total--population that matters when explaining cross-
country differences in the timing of the transition, and that urban population matters 
more than income, represents a step towards validating this type of theory.  
 
My second result is that countries that experienced an early demographic 
transition were relatively much richer (i.e., compared to the average world income in 
the year at which they transitioned) than those that experienced it in recent years. This 
suggests that the importance of income as a trigger factor has declined over time and 
that the demand for human capital, proxied by the level of urban population, is 
becoming an even more important determinant for today’s developing countries. 
                                                 
2 A lack of accurate data precludes me from extending this exercise to a sufficiently large number of early 
transitions. 
3 Whether this pressure comes from a supply effect (e.g., through an increase in the probability of finding 
“a new Einstein”) or a demand effect (e.g., through an increase in the demand for food that stimulates 
technological progress) is an intriguing open question that I do not explore here. See Kremer (1993) and 
Boserup (1981) for an exposition of the former and latter views, respectively.  
 3
 
One policy implication of the paper is that developing countries that are pursuing 
strategies to decrease their fertility rates should encourage policies that stimulate 
technological progress and/or schooling, hence raising the demand for human capital. 
An indirect way to achieve this is to promote a sustainable rural-urban migration 
process.4 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews 
relevant papers related to the study. The data used in the paper are described in 
Section 3. The two parts of the empirical study are developed in Section 4. Finally, 
Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature 
  
Most empirical papers that attempt to describe cross-country differences in the 
demographic transition process focus on “early” transitions that took place in Europe 
in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. This is understandable, because 
comprehensive data for today’s developing countries, which represent the vast 
majority of countries that experienced their demographic transition after 1950 or have 
not reached it yet, have been scarce until recently. As Reher (2004) explains it: “Our 
understanding of the demographic transition among the latecomers is severely limited 
because in most of these countries it has only recently begun.” New datasets created 
by the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and several authors, however, make it 
possible to have accurate data on different variables to test existing theories of the 
demographic transition or to simply characterize this process in developing countries.  
 
Existing studies follow two very different avenues. On the one hand, 
demographers focus almost exclusively on the role of cultural factors, such as religion 
or social values, to explain these transitions. They also place much emphasis on the 
importance of family planning techniques and government intervention to trigger 
sharp falls in fertility.5 On the other hand, economists emphasize the importance of 
income and the demand for human capital to induce families to substitute quantity for 
quality of children.6 To my knowledge, however, no comprehensive, formal study 
uses the available data to compare the transitions of today’s developed and 
developing countries. 
 
 Some authors analyze the case of the United States or of some other developed 
country. For instance, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) focus on the United States 
                                                 
4 One paper that advocates further rural-urban migration in China is Au and Henderson (2006). According 
to their calculations, existing barriers to urbanization have significantly lowered the Chinese potential GDP 
per capita. 
5 See Kirk (1996) for a review of these studies. 
6 Galor (2005) provides a very comprehensive review of different theories proposed by economists and 
argues against the approach taken by demographers. 
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experience only, whereas Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) compare the U.S. 
demographic transition with that of Europe in the nineteenth century.  
 
The empirical evidence for today’s developing countries is much sparser, and it 
reduces to a few, mostly outdated studies. Rosero-Bixby (1998) and Defo (1998) 
analyze this process in Costa Rica and Cameroon, respectively. In an older paper, 
Rutstein and Medica (1978) focus on the cases of Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and 
Peru. Soares (2007) presents a comprehensive review of trends and causes of the 
reduction in mortality in developing countries, but he does not study the demographic 
transition per se. Hill and Pebley (1989) offer a comprehensive study for developing 
countries, but it is also quite outdated, and its main goal is to characterize child 
mortality in developing countries.7 My study is closely related to Reher (2004). Reher 
compares demographic transitions in Europe with those of currently developing 
countries, finding important similarities. He does not, however, use formal 
econometric techniques to analyze the role of different variables as triggers of 
demographic transitions. 
     
    My paper is also indirectly related to literature that examines the importance of 
urban agglomerations as locations that enhance technological progress (Carlino et al. 
2007) and how this, in turn, generates a demand for human capital that boosts wages 
(Ciccone and Hall, 1996). Furthermore, the finding that the degree of urbanization is 
a crucial trigger of demographic transitions is consistent with several theoretical 
papers. Galor and Weil (2000) develop a model in which there is a positive 
interaction between increases in population density and technological progress. The 
latter ultimately generates an industrial demand for human capital and spurs further 
technological progress, leading to a demographic transition. The importance of urban 
population as a trigger factor of structural change in a country’s economy is the core 
of Boucekkine et al. (2007), who present a model in which higher population density 
may trigger the transition from stagnation to growth. The mechanism through which 
this takes place is that higher density stimulates the creation of additional schools, and 
hence facilitates the switch from quantity to quality of children. Finally, de la Croix et 
al. (2008) find that in Sweden, during the 1800-2000 period, increases in population 
density raise productivity and critically contribute to the demographic transition.  
 
My second empirical finding--that late demographic transitions have been reached 
at a much lower relative level of income--is reminiscent of Parente and Prescott’s 
(2000) result that per-capita GDP in the economic miracles of the postwar grew much 
faster than in countries that escaped the Malthusian trap in the late-nineteenth 
century. Also related to the different timing of various events in today and yesterday’s 
developing countries, Cuberes (2009) shows that urban primacy, the ratio of the 
population in the largest city of a country to its total or urban population, around the 
time of the demographic transition is much lower in late transitions than in early ones. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See also Harbison (2005), Wolpin (1997), and Bulatao and Lee (1983). 
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3. Data 
 
Reher (2004) provides data on the approximate dates at which the demographic 
transition took place in a large set of currently developed and developing countries. 
Using data mostly from the UN’s Demographic Yearbook (2000) on crude birth and 
infant mortality rates, he chooses these dates using the following strategy. He sets the 
date of the demographic transition (DT) at the beginning of the first quinquennial 
after a peak, where fertility declines by at least 8% over the two quinquennia and 
never increases again to levels approximating the original take-off point. While this 
strategy is arguably somewhat arbitrary, it leads to unambiguous transition dates for 
most developing countries, which are the focus of my study. 
 
A list of these dates, along with a histogram that shows their distribution, can be 
found in Table 1A and Figure 1A of the Appendix. As shown, most transitions took 
place after 1950, and they concentrate in 1965 (12 cases) and 1985 (15 cases). Figure 
2A in the Appendix shows data on total fertility rates and the Reher’s date for a few 
countries. Although the chosen transition date is not always the most precise one, it is 
apparent that his estimates do a reasonable job at identifying a structural change in 
fertility behavior.8 For instance, while the estimate of the transition date in France is 
too high, the one corresponding to Botswana, India, and Mexico coincides with a 
clear structural change in the total fertility rates of these countries. On the other hand, 
Sierra Leone is an example of a country that has not yet experienced a demographic 
transition. 
 
Data on total and urban population and on infant mortality rates are obtained from 
the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects and the World Development Indicators, 
respectively. Finally, I use data on real per capita GDP from both Maddison (2003) 
and the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2006). 
 
 
4. Empirical Strategy and Results 
 
4.1. Determinants of the Demographic Transition  
 
In this section I examine the main determinants of the DT date in my sample of 
countries. I begin by simply regressing the DT date on historical real per-capita 
income using Maddison data for the 1850-2000 period. I estimate the following 
model: 
 
εβα ++= yDT ln)ln( 1   (1) 
 
                                                 
8 A more careful look at the data reveals that his estimates are indeed reasonably accurate. This analysis is 
available upon request. 
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where DT is Reher’s estimate of the demographic transition date; y  is the country’s 
average per-capita income in the years previous to its transition date; and ε  is a 
standard error term.  
 
I first run the regression for the entire sample and then explore whether the effect 
of y is different in early transitions than in late ones. To accomplish the latter, I define 
the dummy variable Dearly that takes value of one if the transition date is before the 
median transition date (1980 in the sample), and zero otherwise, and interact it with 
per-capita income y:9 
 
εββα +++= )*ln(ln)ln( 21 yDyDT early   (2) 
 
This division leads to 61 early and 48 late transitions. Table 2A in the Appendix 
lists the countries that belong to each group. The estimates of regressions (1) and (2) 
are displayed in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: The Effect of Per-Capita GDP on the Timing of the Demographic Transition 
Using Maddison Data 
 
[1] [2]
log of Average GDPpc -0.006*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.002)
log of Avg GDPpc*Dummy_Early -0.003***
(0.0003)
constant 7.59***
(0.01)
Method of estimation OLS OLS
Number of observations 110 110
R2 0.07 0.48  
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
The first column of the table shows that, without controlling for anything else, a 
country’s level of income is an important determinant of the date at which it reaches 
its DT. Richer countries tend to experience the transition significantly earlier than 
poorer ones. The second column indicates that the importance of income as a 
determinant of the DT is more pronounced in “early” DTs (those that took place in 
1980 or earlier). 
 
 Next I add two explanatory variables to the previous regression: the country’s 
total population and urban population. These are indicators that, according to some of 
the economic theories summarized above, should be important triggers of the DT: 
                                                 
9 Choosing 1950 as the critical transition date that defines early and late transitions does not change the 
qualitative results of Table 1. 
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εβββα ++++= UNyDT lnlnln)ln( 321   (2) 
 
where, as before, DT is Reher’s estimate of the demographic transition date and y  is 
average GDP per capita; N and U denote average total and rural population, 
respectively; and ε  is a standard error term. 
 
Note that reliable data on urban population for a large set of countries are 
available only for the 1950-2000 period. This, together with the fact that the DT in 
most of today’s developed countries took place prior to 1950, implies that the 
regression above is estimated using mainly today’s developing countries.10 Finally, 
because the data on per-capita GDP are more comprehensive in the Penn World Table 
(PWT) dataset than in the Maddison one for this time interval, I use the former in the 
estimation.11 Table 2 shows the OLS estimates of (2). 
 
 
Table 2: The Effect of Per-Capita GDP and Total and Urban Population on the Timing of 
the Demographic Transition Using PWT Data 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
log of Average GDPpc 0.002** 0.001* 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.001)
log of Avg Total Population -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005)
log of Avg Urban Population -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
constant 7.58*** 7.59*** 7.55*** 7.56***
(0.005) (0.01) (0.007) (0.01)
Method of estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
Number of observations 79 79 79 79
R2 0.05 0.06 0.29 0.3  
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **,*** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
First, notice that the coefficient on per-capita GDP is now always positive and 
significant. This is in sharp contrast with the estimates of the first column of Table 1, 
which show a strong negative correlation between a country’s income and the date at 
which it reaches the demographic transition. This can be explained by the fact that, as 
argued above, Table 2 contains mainly what we currently call developing countries, 
whereas Table 1 uses both developed and developing countries. For today’s 
developing countries, a higher income delays rather than anticipates the demographic 
                                                 
10 The sample size drops from 110 to 79 from regression (1) to (2). 
11 Estimates using the Maddison dataset are quite similar to the ones reported here and are available upon 
request. 
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transition. Notice that once one controls for early and late transitions, per-capita 
income is no longer significant in the second column of Table 1, which confirms this 
hypothesis. 
 
 In specification [2], total population is not statistically significant. This may 
reflect the fact that, by construction, per-capita GDP (the ratio of GDP and total 
population) and total population are highly negatively correlated. Alternatively, it 
may suggest that a country’s total population level is indeed a poor predictor of its 
transition date. Specifications [3] and [4] show a central result of the paper: The level 
of urban population is a crucial determinant of the DT date. In particular, the larger a 
country’s urban population, the earlier it reaches this date. The effect is unchanged if 
one adds total population as a regressor. Indeed, it is interesting to notice that total 
population never has a significant effect; only the urban population does, which is 
consistent with the idea that technological progress and/or the demand for human 
capital originates in cities. Using the urbanization rate, defined as the ratio of urban 
population to total population, leads to similar results. I choose to include both 
regressors separately, however, because it is less restrictive. 
 
One may argue that it is urban density rather than urban population that really 
matters to triggering a demographic transition. I define total and urban densities as the 
ratio of total and urban population and land, respectively, and use these variables 
instead of total population and urban population in regression (2).12 Table 3 shows 
that none of the results changes significantly. A country’s total density does not 
significantly correlate with its DT date once one controls for the country’s level of 
income. Urban density, in contrast, has a strong negative effect on this date. When 
one adds the two densities together, the signs are preserved, although now the 
positive effect of total density is statistically significant, probably because, by 
construction, the two densities are strongly correlated.  
 
                                                 
12 Data on country size are from City Population at http://www.citypopulation.de/. 
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Table 3: The Effect of Per-Capita GDP and Total and Urban Density on the Timing of the 
Demographic Transition Using PWT Data 
 
[1] [2] [3]
log of Average GDPpc 0.002** 0.002*** 0.004***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009)
log of Avg Total Density -0.0005 0.005***
(0.0005) (0.001)
log of Avg Urban Density -0.001*** -0.006***
(0.0005) (0.001)
constant 7.58*** 7.58*** 7.56***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Method of estimation OLS OLS OLS
Number of observations 79 79 79
R2 0.06 0.13 0.3  
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **,*** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
The distinction between urban population and urban density raises an interesting 
question. Is it the absolute or the relative (relative to the country’s size) urban 
population that matters as a trigger of the DT? This paper does not offer a conclusive 
answer, but I argue that urban density may be a misleading indicator of the amount of 
productive activities that take place in urban areas. A small country that is mostly 
rural may have very high urban (or total) density. In contrast, a very large country 
with a small number of large cities will display a very low ratio. However, one might 
argue that the level of urban activities, technological progress for instance, is 
probably higher in the latter. In other words, it may not really matter if a large 
fraction of the country’s population lives in rural areas as long as there are enough 
people in the cities (inventing new things and boosting the demand for human 
capital). In any case, distinguishing between the roles of the total vs. relative urban 
population in promoting technological progress in cities, while interesting in its own, 
is outside the scope of this paper.  
 
  
The role of infant mortality 
 
According to classic transition theories that demographers often postulate, 
mortality declines appear to play a central role in the decline of fertility, and hence in 
triggering the DT.13 This argument has also been defended by some economists who 
incorporate a precautionary demand for children in their models. Consider a setup 
with an uncertain, positive rate of infant mortality. If one assumes that households 
have an ideal amount of children, it is optimal for them to have an offspring larger 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Coale (1973) and van de Walle (1986). Galloway et al. (1998) analyze the link between 
infant mortality and the fertility transition in Europe and discuss the case study of Prussia. 
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than this number to ensure that the surviving number of children approaches their 
optimal one. It is then natural to argue that the secular decline in infant mortality may 
have induced a significant decline in the number of born children. This decline may, 
at some point, have triggered a DT. Sah (1991), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Tamura 
(2006), and Cuberes and Tamura (2009) are examples of models that incorporate a 
precautionary demand for children. The empirical validity of such a precautionary 
motive, although still an open question, has been criticized on theoretical and 
empirical grounds by Galor (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), and Doepke 
(2005), among others.14 Table 4 shows the results that include the infant mortality 
rate as an additional regressor.  
 
 
Table 4: The Additional Effect of Infant Mortality 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
log of Average GDPpc 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log of Avg Infant Mortality 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
log of Avg Total Population -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0005)
log of Avg Urban Population -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
constant 7.53*** 7.54*** 7.52*** 7.53***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Method of estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
Number of observations 79 79 79 79
R2 0.3 0.3 0.46 0.47  
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
These estimates indicate that countries with a higher infant mortality rate tend to 
experience a later DT. Interestingly, the sign and significance of the other regressors 
are unaffected. In particular, a larger urban population is still associated with an 
earlier DT. While formally testing the empirical relevance of the precautionary 
demand for children is outside the scope of this paper, this result seems to indicate 
that the secular decline in infant mortality plays an important role in triggering the DT 
in today’s developing countries. One possible theoretical mechanism through which 
this may have happened is the existence of such a precautionary motive in the utility 
function of parents.15  
 
                                                 
14 In contrast, Eckstein et al. (1999) show that mortality decline played a role in the demographic transition 
in Sweden. 
15 It is also important to point out that it is not the goal of this paper to provide conclusive empirical 
evidence to dismiss or favour economic vs. non-economic factors as determinants of DTs. While 
interesting in its own right, a lack of data on the relevant variables, mainly cultural ones, and space leaves 
this for further research. 
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The main finding of this section is that urban population is a key trigger factor of 
DTs, even after controlling for a country’s per-capita GDP and other indicators, such 
as total population and infant mortality rate. This supports the view that the transition 
from rural to urban societies may indeed be more important than the society’s wealth 
in explaining this structural change, especially in transitions that today’s developing 
countries have experienced. My results cannot disentangle the specific mechanism 
through which this occurs. It may be that the more expensive life in cities triggers a 
switch from an emphasis on the quantity to the quality of children. Another possible 
story is that positive spillovers among people living in cities induce rapid 
technological change (as in Galor and Weil 2000) or enhance the construction of 
schools (as in Boucekkine et al. 2007), with a subsequent switch in emphasis from the 
quantity to the quality of children.  
 
In any case, the estimates above are consistent with income and urbanization 
being substitute triggers of DTs. Although one needs more accurate data on 
urbanization to formally test this, it is a fact that the rural-urban migration process 
was at its early stages when the forerunners experienced their DTs. In most countries, 
this rural-urban process has continued at a more or less constant rate since then. This 
implies that the degree of urbanization in the countries that experienced early DTs 
must have been relatively low compared to countries that experienced them in the last 
fifty years. This can be rationalized with a model that suggests that this much higher 
degree of urbanization acts as a substitute for high income that triggers DTs in 
today’s developing countries. The next section explores this issue in more detail. 
 
 
4.2. Relative Economic Development and Urbanization around the Demographic 
Transition Years 
 
In this section I attempt to answer the following two questions. First, at what point of 
their development process do countries reach their DT? Second, is this critical 
relative level of development consistently different between forerunner countries--
those that experienced a transition in the late-nineteenth or early-twentieth century--
and latecomers? 
 
 To address these points, I first calculate the world’s average income (using 
Maddison data) for every year during the 1850-2000 period. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of this variable over time, which, perhaps not surprisingly, exhibits a clear 
positive trend. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Average World Income over Time 
 
 Next I calculate the income, relative to the world’s average, of each country in the 
year of its DT. Finally, I plot this relative income against the DT year. Figure 2 shows 
that the relation between the two variables is clearly negative.16 The correlation 
coefficient is -0.49, which is significant at the 1% level. 
 
                                                 
16 In results not reported here, I show that Qatar is a clear outlier in the sample. It experienced the 
demographic transition in 1955, but its relative income was extremely high at that point in time. Including 
Qatar, the correlation coefficient between the two variables is -0.3, significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 2: Relative Income in the Demographic Transition Year 
 
 These calculations show that countries that experienced the DT relatively late did 
so at a much lower level of development than those who did it earlier on.17 Another 
way to see this is to calculate the average relative income year of countries with 
“early” and “late” transitions. Table 5 shows that the relative per-capita income of the 
average frontrunner is above 1, indicating that it is relatively rich. In contrast, the 
average latecomer is a poor country (its relative income is clearly below 1). 
 
 
Table 5: Relative Income in Early and Late Demographic Transitions 
 
Early Transitions Late Transitions
Average Relative Income 1.04 0.32
Number of Countries 61 48  
 
Note: A transition is classified as “early” if it takes place prior to 1980, and “late” otherwise. 
 
  
                                                 
17 Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are the only countries that they were relatively rich when they 
experienced a late demographic transition. 
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4.3. Income and Urbanization as Substitute Triggers of the Demographic Transition 
 
Section 4.1 shows that the size of a country’s urban population is an important factor 
to explain cross-country differences in the timing of recent (i.e., after 1950) DTs. 
Although because of a lack of accurate data on urban population it is not possible to 
test whether GDP or urbanization was the key trigger of early DTs, the fact that early 
DTs took place at a relatively high level of y and the late ones occurred at relatively 
low levels of y is consistent with income being the key factor in early DTs but not late 
ones. 
 
As argued above, this can be rationalized with the following story: In today’s 
developing countries, urbanization can be seen as a “substitute trigger” for income. 
One obvious caveat is that it is not clear which effect is attributable to per-capita GDP 
or urbanization, because the two are highly correlated in the sample.18 However, my 
results highlight three reasons why urbanization seems to be a more important 
determinant, especially for latecomers. First, results in Table 1 suggest that the impact 
of income, while negative for the entire sample, it is definitely more so for early 
transitions. Second, Table 2 shows that, when put together in a regression that mostly 
uses latecomers, urbanization has a larger impact than income on the predicted DT 
date.19 Finally, Figure 2 confirms that countries’ relative income was high in early 
transitions and low in late ones. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Disentangling the main determinants of demographic transitions in today’s 
developing countries is extremely important for both academics and policymakers. 
This paper aims to draw lessons from early demographic transitions for more recent 
ones, using a new dataset on demographic transition dates for what we now call 
developed and developing countries.20  
 
The results suggest that the size of a country’s urban population is a key variable 
to explain cross-country differences in the timing of these transitions. Even after 
controlling for income, total population, and infant mortality rates, more urbanized 
countries tend to experience the demographic transition earlier. Moreover, the 
importance of income as a trigger factor is much lower in late transitions (i.e., 1980 or 
later) than in early ones. One interpretation of these findings is that today’s 
developing countries can afford to experience their demographic transitions at 
relatively low levels of development. The fact that they are very urbanized is enough 
to trigger this change.   
                                                 
18 The correlation coefficient is 0.6, which is significant at the 1% level. 
19 Moreover, in regressions that include urbanization alone its estimated coefficient (-0.003) is larger than 
that of income (0.002). The R2 is also higher if one uses only urbanization as a regressor (0.09 vs. 0.048). 
20 This is similar in spirit to the Unified Growth Theory, which aims to establish a relation between early 
growth takeoffs (at the dawn of the nineteenth century) and modern ones (post 1950). See Galor (2005). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1A: Reher’s (2004) Predicted Transition Dates 
 
 
Country Year 
Algeria 1975
Angola 1995
Argentina 1910
Austria 1915
Bahamas 1965
Bahrain 1970
Bangladesh 1980
Barbados 1955
Belgium 1905
Belize 1965
Benin 1985
Bhutan 1995
Bolivia 1975
Botswana 1975
Brazil 1965
Bulgaria 1925
Burkina Faso 2000
Burundi 1995
Cameroon 1985
Canada 1915
Central African Republic 1990
Chad 2000
Chile 1960
China 1970
Colombia 1965
Comoros 1990
Congo 2000
Costa Rica 1965
Cote d'Ivoire 1985
Democratic Republic of Congo 2000
Denmark 1910
Djibouti 1985
Dominican Republic 1965
Ecuador 1970
Egypt 1965
El Salvador 1965
Ethiopia 1990
Finland 1915
France 1900
Gabon 2000
Gambia 1985
Germany 1900
Ghana 1985
Guatemala 1985  
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Table 1A (continued)  
 
Guinea 1995
Guinea-Bissau 2000
Guyana 1965
Haiti 1985
Honduras 1985
Hungary 1890
India 1960
Indonesia 1970
Iran 1985
Iraq 1975
Israel 1955
Italy 1925
Jamaica 1925
Japan 1950
Jordan 1975
Kenya 1980
Kuwait 1975
Laos 1995
Lesotho 1985
Liberia 1995
Madagascar 1990
Malawi 1980
Malaysia 1965
Mali 1995
Mauritania 1980
Mauritius 1960
Mexico 1970
Mongolia 1975
Morocco 1965
Mozambique 2000
Myanmar 1975
Namibia 1990
Nepal 1995
Netherlands 1910
Nicaragua 1985
Niger 1985
Nigeria 1995
Norway 1905
Oman 1995
Panama 1970
Paraguay 1985
Peru 1975
Philippines 1955
Portugal 1925
Puerto Rico 1950
Qatar 1955
Romania 1935
Rwanda 1995
Saudi Arabia 1980
Senegal 1980  
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Table 1A (continued)  
 
Sierra Leone 2000
Singapore 1955
Somalia 2000
South Africa 1975
South Korea 1960
Spain 1910
Sri Lanka 1960
Sudan 1980
Suriname 1965
Sweden 1865
Switzerland 1910
Syria 1985
Tanzania 1975
Thailand 1965
Togo 1995
Trinidad and Tobago 1965
Tunisia 1965
Uganda 2000
United Kingdom 1905
Uruguay 1890
USA 1925
Venezuela 1965
Yemen 2000
Zambia 1980
Zimbabwe 1970  
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Table 2A: Early and Late Demographic Transitions 
 
Country Reher's Transition Date Country Reher's Transition Date
Algeria 1975 Angola 1995
Argentina 1910 Bangladesh 1980
Austria 1915 Benin 1985
Bahrain 1970 Burkina Faso 2000
Belgium 1905 Burundi 1995
Bolivia 1975 Cameroon 1985
Botswana 1975 Central African Republic 1990
Brazil 1965 Chad 2000
Bulgaria 1925 Comoros 1990
Canada 1915 Congo 2000
Chile 1960 Cote d'Ivoire 1985
China 1970 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2000
Colombia 1965 Djibouti 1985
Costa Rica 1965 Gabon 2000
Denmark 1910 Gambia 1985
Dominican Republic 1965 Ghana 1985
Ecuador 1970 Guatemala 1985
Egypt 1965 Guinea 1995
El Salvador 1965 Guinea-Bissau 2000
Finland 1915 Haiti 1985
France 1900 Honduras 1985
Hungary 1890 Iran 1985
India 1960 Kenya 1980
Indonesia 1970 Laos 1995
Iraq 1975 Lesotho 1985
Israel 1955 Liberia 1995
Italy 1925 Madagascar 1990
Jamaica 1925 Malawi 1980
Japan 1950 Mali 1995
Jordan 1975 Mauritania 1980
Kuwait 1975 Mozambique 2000
Malaysia 1965 Namibia 1990
Mauritius 1960 Nepal 1995
Mexico 1970 Nicaragua 1985
Mongolia 1975 Niger 1985
Morocco 1965 Nigeria 1995
Myanmar 1975 Oman 1995
Netherlands 1910 Paraguay 1985
Norway 1905 Rwanda 1995
Panama 1970 Saudi Arabia 1980
Peru 1975 Senegal 1980
Philippines 1955 Sierra Leone 2000
Portugal 1925 Somalia 2000
Puerto Rico 1950 Sudan 1980
Qatar 1955 Syria 1985
Republic of Korea 1960 Uganda 2000
Romania 1935 Yemen 2000
Singapore 1955 Zambia 1980
South Africa 1975
Spain 1910
Sri Lanka 1960
Sweden 1865
Switzerland 1910
Tanzania 1975
Thailand 1965
Trinidad and Tobago 1965
Tunisia 1965
United Kingdom 1905
United States of America 1925
Uruguay 1890
Venezuela 1965
Zimbabwe 1970
Early Transitions Late Transitions
 
 
Note: A transition is classified as “early” if it takes place prior to 1980 and “late” otherwise. 
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Figure 1A: Histogram of Reher’s Demographic Transition Dates 
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Figure 2A: Some Examples of Reher’s Demographic Transition Dates 
